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Abstract
It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the
consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data.
These inferences correspond to projections P and Q, belonging to different consistent sets,
with the properties that PQ = QP = 0 and P 6= 1−Q. To many, this seems undesirable in
a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories
formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e.
inferences P and Q where P = 1−Q. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction
between contradictory and contrary inferences.
It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined
quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences,
and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories,
which excludes both.
In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples
given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism.
As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against
their approach to quantum theory.
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Griffiths and Hartle[1] correctly reiterate that logical contradictions in the consistent
histories formalism can be avoided by restricting one’s reasoning to a single consistent set.
This is, of course, generally understood, and clearly stated in the original Letter.[2] But
it is no great virtue. Any formalism which ascribes probability distributions to sets of
histories in quantum theory can be made free from contradiction by such a restriction,
whether or not any consistency criterion is imposed on the sets, whatever rule is used
to define history probabilities. There are infinitely many such formalisms, and a priori
the consistent histories formalism has no special status. The questions we should ask of
it, or any other quantum history formalism, are whether its rules are natural and lead
to physically plausible and scientifically useful conclusions. It is the naturality of the
consistency criterion and the plausibility of its physical implications which the Letter
addresses. (Criticisms of the consistent histories approach as a scientific theory can be
found elsewhere.[e.g.3,4,5,6])
To examine any history-based formalism properly, it is necessary to stand outside
that formalism, to ask: Why these rules, rather than others? What are their physical
consequences? How do they compare with those of alternative rules? To attempt to
defend the consistent histories formalism simply by restating the internal consistency of
its own rules, and to argue that a particular asymmetry is acceptable simply because it is
a feature of the formalism, as Griffiths and Hartle in effect do, is to fail to address these
key questions.
Our understanding of what it means for two physical propositions to be contradic-
tory or contrary is — historically and, unless we are already irrevocably committed to
the formalism under discussion, logically — prior to our understanding of the features
of a given formalism. Our views on whether the formalism is natural, plausible or use-
ful are, inevitably, framed in terms of that prior understanding. The standard contra-
dictory/contrary terminology thus seems to me most appropriate, though of course the
argument is invariant under translation.
To recap: the Letter points out that the consistent histories formalism allows con-
trary inferences, although one of the arguments used in its justification is that it prevents
contradictory inferences. As Ref. [1] notes, “There are no initial and final states for which
projectors P and (1−P ) can have probability one in different consistent families, because
the probability assigned to any event on the basis of given data is independent of the
consistent family”. But — it is vital to be clear on this — this is a deliberately chosen
feature, not a logically necessary requirement. In many history-based formalisms of quan-
tum theory — for example, that based on unrestricted sets of histories — a proposition
P can have probability one in one set and its complement (1− P ) non-zero probability in
another, conditioned on the same data. These formalisms too produce no inconsistency if
reasoning is carried out only within one set.[4,6] The term “consistent histories” is in this
respect misleading.
No argument for the asymmetry between contradictory and contrary inferences has
yet been produced. To say[comment] “a pair P and 1−P can always be associated with the
logical notion of ‘contradictory’, while perpendicular projectors need not be associated with
the logical notion of ‘contrary’ ” is, again, to report a feature of the consistent histories
formalism, not a general truth. In attempting to defend the asymmetry, Griffiths and
Hartle simply restate it.
Consistent historians must also accept that contrary statements about past events —
“the electron went through slit A with probability one” and “the electron went through slit
B with probability one”, say — can be equally valid, and hence that standard ordering in-
ferences based on our observations can fail. For example, the statement that a particle was
observed in one region need not imply that it was observed in a region containing the first,
even when each statement can consistently be considered together with our observations.[7]
I should stress again that these facts do not amount to a logical refutation of the con-
sistent histories approach. Readers will no doubt form their own views of their implications
for its naturality and plausibility.
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